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The move ‘beyond deliberative democracy’ seems to have begun over five years ago; 
certainly it gathers pace1.  This paper sketches a new approach to democratic theory 
which draws on provocative aspects of the deliberative turn, among other resources.  
It seeks to join current debates about the radical reshaping of democracy, and as such 
it is a product of ‘interpretive reason’.  As Bauman puts it, interpretive reason ‘is 
engaged in dialogue where legislative reason strives for soliloquy’ (1992: 126).  
Legislative reason involves the philosopher’s untrammelled ‘licence to judge’ and to 
impose; interpretive reason centres on the acceptance of the inevitability of pluralism 
and ‘the undecidability and inconclusiveness of all interpretation’ (Bauman 1992: 
117;131).   I would not want to push the distinction too far, but the intention is clear 
enough: to open up existing lines of innovation in democratic theory to mutual 
enrichment via mutual engagement.   
 
The new approach I sketch is distinctively proceduralist: it is focused on the shaping 
of binding collective political decision-making procedures, and it accepts outcomes as 
legitimate if they have been produced by a certain procedure.  It is also reflexive, in 
that it regards political principles, mechanisms and institutions as open to constant 
change and adjustment of their meaning and importance.  Democracy can and will be 
and mean different things in different times and places (countries, cultures).  These 
things follow from the proceduralist focus and reflexive character of deliberative 
models, but the latter too often take an unduly limited view of procedural possibilities 
– dismissing out of hand so-called ‘aggregative’ models, and ignoring direct 
democracy, for example - and how they might complement and lend legitimacy to 
each other.  My approach is also, I trust, ecumenical; deliberative, direct, 
participatory, ecological, difference, cosmopolitan and representative democrats may 
all find reasons to work with something like it to broaden their conceptions or models 
of democracy.  The modest motivation behind it is to contribute to efforts to build on 
the innovative ideas and energy of democratic theory today by spinning a range of 
threads into a new perspective on democracy which reflects social complexity, 
including the complexity in the meaning of democracy itself, and points the way to a 
deepened democratic practice by forging certain links between ideals and practical 
mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
1 See Young (1996), Dryzek (2000). 
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Sketching reflexive proceduralism 
Reflexive proceduralism consists of  a cluster of (a) principles of , (b) devices for, and 
(c) phases of democratic decision-making.  I shall discuss briefly each in turn, though 
as I hope becomes clear, the ways in which the three are intertwined is the key. 
 
Principles 
I put forward four principles which I suggest lie at the heart of democracy (though 
these are not the only possibilities):  political equality, inclusion, expressive freedom 
and transparency.  I will not mount an extended defence of this selection.  Briefly, 
political equality because no system can be minimally democratic without 
institutionalising equality between citizens in some substantial way.  Inclusion 
follows from political equality, but is entered here on its own because only an 
inclusive, involving form of institutionalising political equality can be acceptable 
democratically.  Expressive freedom because the right to make one’s choices in an 
uncoerced manner does not automatically follow from the previous two principles, 
and is yet critical to a self-respecting democracy.  And transparency because equality, 
inclusion and freedom must be seen to be done2.  So, a process of mutual implication 
ties each of these four to each of the others with various degrees of strength and 
clarity.  Inclusion, for example, follows from political equality: systematic exclusion 
in any form will violate any robust conception of political equality3.   
 
Further to clarification of principles through the terms of their mutual implication, the 
approach I adopt holds that the detailed and practical meaning of , and justifications 
for, the principles can only be worked out in their institutionalisation, embodiment in 
systems and actions, and coherence with other compelling principles.   
 
In this sense, the names of the principles are conceded to be convenient placeholders 
for a bundle of meanings, each of which may only be invoked by also invoking other 
principles, and institutions or devices that might embody and bring them to life.  This 
approach runs against common assumptions about principles as the basis for 
conceptions of democracy.  A common approach is deductive: equality for example 
can be deduced from a deeper religious (or even contractarian) foundation, and in turn 
institutions and practices can be deduced from the principle4.  By contrast, my 
approach stresses how principles, institutions and devices are turned inward towards 
each other, gaining vitality and meaning from each other, as ideas and as concrete 
political practices, without reference to some philosophical ‘outside’ which can justify 
and define the principles with finality.  
 
                                                 
2 This set only looks (marginally) different from, for example, Gutmann and Thompson’s set of three 
procedural, three substantive principles for their theory of deliberative democracy (1996).  I would 
argue, for example, that political equality, the root principle of democracy, is the basis of any 
invocation of reciprocity, publicity and accountability (their three process principles).  See Young 
(1999; 2000) for a arguments that inclusion ought to be added to Gutmann and Thompson’s process 
principles.     
3 This approach dovetails with another which emphasises the coherence of a system of principles as 
contributing positively to the moral force of the system they constitute.  See for example Dworkin’s 
(1975) comments on Rawls’ theory. 
4 This is the approach taken influentially for example in Dahl (1989), also pursued in Saward (1998). 
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 In this respect, reflexive proceduralism is antifoundationalist5.  Insofar as there are 
external referents which contribute to the production of meanings, these may include 
other principles which have acknowledged resonances with democracy.  In this 
respect, the four principles I have noted briefly do not necessarily form a stable set of 
‘core’ democratic principles; one might mention, for example, Beetham’s (1999) 
elaboration of ‘popular control’, or the foundational role of ‘autonomy’ for Held 
(1995).  In certain normative and institutional contexts, these may successfully be 
articulated as core democratic principles.  A given set of democratic principles will be 
a dynamic rather than a static set because, in semiotic terms, the potential principles 
and ‘democracy’ itself are both signifiers (of each other, in various ways) and 
signifieds.  They operate within chains of signification (or meaning-generation) in 
which no privileged point of entry can be stipulated so as to dictate the parameters of 
political discourse6.        
 
‘Antifoundationalism’ is not just jargon; it matters, because it stresses the  principles 
and practice of democracy as things we conceive, make, argue about and revise – 
constantly – in part because their cannot be a final end, a grounding version of an 
indisputable principle to stop all legitimate dispute7.   
 
Let’s fill out this view a little further. 
 
Commentators of all persuasions within the broad church of democratic theory – from 
Schumpeterians to radical participationists – agree that political equality is a basic 
principle of democracy.  Does it mean equal rights protection by courts? Equal votes?  
Equal opportunities to stand for office?  Equality of resources that underpin 
citizenship capacities? Equal (negative) freedom?  Equal opportunities, even if this 
means unequal resources? Or any one of a range of further possibilities, in 
combination with some or all of the above, in a certain order of priority?  It is unlikely 
any ‘higher principle’ will rescue us from interpretive overload; it is precisely the 
irreducibly multiple referents of the principle of equality in itself that leads us to ask 
                                                 
5 In this I follow Rorty (1996: 333-4) when he writes: ‘the antifoundationalist’s central claim is that 
attempts to ground a practice on something outside the practice will always be more or less 
disingenuous. . . the object outside the practice, the purported foundation, is always just a 
hypostatisation of certain selected components of that practice’. 
6 Political theorists, and political leaders, will of course continue to stipulate variations along the lines 
of ‘What democracy really means is x’.  Their efforts taken together add to the richness of democratic 
possibility at a general level – despite the drive to closure and restriction that any one such effort 
represents - though some stipulations will carry more authority than others by virtue of resonances with 
other principles, familiar and successful devices, and further political-cultural features. 
7 There are two argumentative strategies one might follow as a consequence.  One is to offer arguments 
that are as strongly foundationalist as one can manage, accepting all along that any such argument is 
rendered fallible not least by the elusive and metaphorical nature of the language that must be used to 
express it.  Thus, one can simply say ‘here is my argument, with foundations as abstractly compelling 
as I can make them.  I join the democratic conversation with it, alongside the rest of you’.  This could 
be said to be what Rawls does with A Theory of Justice (1972) – on a certain reading of the nature of 
‘reflective equilibrium’, anyhow.  Certainly it is what Walzer (1981) criticises Rawls and others for not 
doing, as he sees it.  A second approach is to bring in more self-consciously the unavoidable 
contingency of, for example, the meaning and justifiability of a principle such as political equality, or 
expressive freedom, into one’s reasoning.  Clearly the language I use here reflects that employed in 
Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983), where something along these lines is famously attempted.   
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more specific questions about its meanings.  Yet we know political equality is critical 
to what we call democracy8. 
 
Inclusion, too: but how, to what extent, for how long, and to what effect?  Which 
aspect of political equality is driving our view of inclusion?  Expressive freedom and 
transparency, arguably, are slightly more straightforward; but each admits of degrees, 
to say the least.   
 
The defence and clarification of the principles cannot take place simply at the more 
abstract level of principled argument. Indeed, it is fundamental to reflexive 
proceduralism that principles gain much of their recommendatory force and 
contextual meaning from successes and stresses in the operation of the devices 
informed by them.  The provisional meanings of principles derive from particular 
practices, including but never confined to processes of abstract reasoning.  For 
example, the meaning and attractiveness of the principle of inclusion will shift as 
(variously) statistically representative bodies and popular policy referendums, 
embodying different interpretations of the principle, are stressed in a given democratic 
procedure.  Likewise, to define appropriate phases which a democratic outcome must 
have passed through to be legitimate will be to give determinate though provisional 
content to one or more of reflexive proceduralism’s principles.  
 
With these principles, any effort to pin down a single, superior meaning – such as 
equality of voting power for political equality – is not unreasonable, but will never be 
able successfully to exclude other credible meanings (and with them alternative 
devices and institutions designed to embody or realise the principle).  Accordingly, 
and in line with my comments about the inward-looking and mutually implicative 
process of giving content to principles, we can say that principles are primarily things 
that we do, rather than rights or statuses that are conferred9.   To act on a principle of 
equality is (contribute to an intersubjective process of) giving it meaning, giving it life 
and referents in specific settings.  To question morally a taken-for-granted institution 
(such as a monarchy) is to ‘perform’ a principle, and to (re)create it in performance.   
 
To be sure, a suggested meaning and form of institutionalisation for a principle such 
as political equality cannot be stretched beyond certain conceptual and practical 
boundaries; there will be instances of manifestly unequal treatment of people that 
must violate any reasonable interpretation of the principle – apartheid is an obvious 
case.  But an obvious question would be this: if the meanings of democracy vary 
according to how principles and devices are articulated and enacted in different 
                                                 
8 Traditional liberal democratic theory defines political equality in formal, numerical and aggregative 
terms (e.g. Dahl 1989); deliberative democrats stress equal respect within and equal access to 
deliberative forums (e.g. Cohen 1989).  The false, wholly artificial separation between aggregative and 
deliberative approaches to democracy has hidden ways in which both interpretations – and their 
institutional embodiments - respond to a compelling feature of political equality as a guide to political 
practice.  These, and other, interpretations can be brought together within the broad framework of a 
reflexive proceduralism. 
 
9 Here I draw loosely on Judith Butler’s approach to ‘gender’.  Butler writes that ‘ . . .the substantive 
effect of gender is performatively produced . . . gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a 
subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed . . . There is no gender identity behind the expressions 
of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its 
results’ (Butler 1990: 24-5). 
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contexts, and if there is no ‘master’ meaning, then how can ‘boundaries’ to the 
application of the term be fixed or even credibly mentioned? 
 
My response would be that there are boundaries to the reasonable interpretation of 
democratic principles (and therefore of democracy), but that the precise nature and 
location of those boundaries is dynamic, and not a fixed affair10.  Political equality 
can mean (or be enacted as) many, overlapping things in different (and even the same) 
contexts, but it cannot mean just anything, anywhere.  More specifically, a given 
interpretation, or attempted enactment, of a principle such as political equality may 
fall beyond the boundaries of reasonable interpretation of the principle if it lacks 
‘resonance’ on three levels.  First, a lack of resonance between the given 
interpretation and how that or related political principles tend to be articulated within 
a local or particular political culture will suggest a boundary.  Second, a lack of 
resonance with broader, prevailing theories and assumptions about polities and 
people, be they contemporarily dominant or subordinate, will raise questions about 
reasonable interpretation.  Thirdly, a lack of resonance or ‘fit’ between a particular 
political device (as discussed below) and the principle or principles it is supposed to 
enact will tend to define a boundary to reasonable interpretation11.  And finally, a lack 
of resonance with broadly accepted systemic and natural constraints on democratic 
practices (such as the ‘economy of time’ – see Beetham 1999: 39-44) will cast a given 
interpretation as unreasonable on the face of it.   
 
In these respects, principles can be articulated and enacted in a variety of ways, but in 
nothing like an infinite variety of ways.  A common approach in political theory is to 
attempt to stipulate a literal or proper meaning for a political principle.  Behind this 
strategy is the assumption, normally unspoken, that a given political principle will or 
does have one, proper, meaning12.  Like a dictionary definition, the denotation of 
given terms can be precise and presented as fixed (for the time being at least).  The 
opposite of the literal approach is what we might call the abstract strategy.  This 
alternative involves denying that anything specific or bounded is necessarily signified 
by naming a principle; anything goes in a system of radically relativist interpretation 
and reinterpretation of principles.  By writing of layered resonances as I have, I am 
attempting to locate between these extremes what we might call in turn a figural 
approach to the boundaries of reasonable interpretation.  According to this view, a 
political principle will provoke varied interpretations depending on shifting 
conventions of what actions or institutions ‘fit’ with the principle, but conventional 
codes will at least produce a delimited set of possible interpretations – a recognisable 
representation of a ‘figure’ that can be understood in varied ways, as it were.  In this 
vein, for example, political inclusion can mean many things – varied connotations will 
                                                 
10 It is noteworthy that efforts to specify the democracy/non-democracy boundary become more 
narrowly focused on one or two institutions (such as electoral turnout) as they aspire to more precise 
specifications of the boundary.  Operationalisation gets in the way of sensitivity to difference and the 
rich instability of meaning. 
11 Gledhill (2000: 75) mentions a useful historical example.  Nineteenth century Latin American 
plantation owners led by Simon Bolivar had little choice but to oppose slavery because as an institution 
it was ‘too incompatible’ with the modern republican model derived from French revolutionary 
influences which they otherwise drew upon. 
12 As Shapiro writes of justice theorists in recent decades: ‘Their arguments often appear to take it for 
granted that there is a correct answer to the question what principles of justice we ought to affirm … ‘ 
(1999: 3). 
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escape stipulative attempts to stop at a single denotation13 – but it cannot mean just 
anything.  Seeking enactment of a principle in a particular way by deployment of a 
political device (such as a referendum – see discussion below) or a sequence of such 
devices may strengthen particular meanings but not dampen down entirely alternative 
or subversive meanings.  Where literal strategies are aimed at objectivity, and abstract 
ones at an atomistic subjectivity, figurative approaches stress an intersubjective 
bounding of acceptable meanings of principles. 
 
There remains real ambiguity here, but it is ambiguity that is unavoidable.  A constant 
temptation of political theorists is to be stipulative about the boundaries to reasonable 
interpretation of principles – and of course of democracy itself.  Often, locutions such 
as ‘most reasonable people could accept that equality could not be taken to mean …’ 
are used by theorists and others to frame such stipulations.  Life is easier with such 
stipulations, but political theory is more reasonable without them.  That, at least, is the 
burden of attempting to avoid ‘legislative reason’.  That said, it is clear that some of 
the considerations that may go into understanding the dynamic boundaries of the 
reasonable interpretation of principles are more than local, e.g. to do with natural and 
systemic constraints and cross-contextual norms concerning meanings and 
applications of principles.  In this respect, at least, adopting a reflexive proceduralist 
approach involves adopting a relativising perspective, but not a relativist one (cf 
Gledhill 2000).   
 
A closely related question – and one that a reflexive proceduralist approach likewise 
renders difficult in very interesting ways – is: What can make democratic principles, 
such as the four I cite above, compelling? No foundational goodness or rightness or 
self-evidence is available to us in our efforts to respond – or so I have argued.  Here, 
we can pinpoint a number of overlapping potential responses, namely some 
combination of (a) the attractions of the boundaries to their reasonable interpretation, 
(b) the complex process of mutual implication which binds them together, (c) their 
cohering with or derivation from other principles outside this democratic set which 
are in specific ways seen as compatible and desirable, (d) widespread positive 
experience with their specific institutional embodiment, and (e) their capacity to 
enervate and engage citizens in specific settings14.  But since these principles are 
                                                 
13 See Barthes’ S/Z (1974) on the interplay between denotation and connotation and the inevitably 
disruptive effect of connotative meanings. 
14 I press no further here the larger issues of the justification of democracy.  If principles are to be 
articulated with many possibilities on the table, and with uncoerced debate over their potential 
meanings and applications, then democratic openness is indeed desirable in general terms (see John 
Barry’s approach to ‘sustainability’ – 1996: 118-20).  Elsewhere I have attempted to show how 
fallibilism itself can be the key part of an argument that can provide democracy with robust theoretical 
foundations that are variously epistemic, and consequentialist (Saward 1998).  Some may still object 
that (e.g.) exclusive racist ‘principles’ may meet the criteria I have set out.  If an irrefutable deduction 
of the superiority of democracy to other political forms were possible, it would (a) not have prevented 
Srebrenica, and (b) would not end the arguments over the value and character of democracy. The clear 
difficulties involved in writing about democracy in a recommendatory fashion from an 
antifoundationalist position are simply unavoidable, and we must face the consequences (the uncertain 
status of our recommendations) as best we can.  As Anne Phillips writes, `We can hardly stake the 
universality of our principles on the fear of what would happen if we abandoned this claim.  The case 
against foundationalism cannot be countered by arguments of an instrumental nature, for if ever the 
‘preference’ for firm foundations is revealed as such (we “need” universal principles, we “need” a 
secure vantage point from outside), the case collapses on itself.  We cannot appeal to the consequences 
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things we do, things defined and refined and disputed as an ongoing part of political 
life, we cannot be more definite than this – though I would maintain that these guides 
are not insignificant.  Here we must move from democratic principles to the devices 
which embody them - and which at the same time contribute critically to how we 
understand and value them.  It is at this level where a reflexive proceduralism may be 
most distinctive, for the essence of proceduralism is that principles are put to work in 
institutions, rather than held in abeyance to judge outcomes in some pristine, above-
the-fray fashion. 
 
Devices 
Political equality, inclusion, expressive freedom and transparency live through formal 
decisional mechanisms or devices which are designed to activate them and which 
come to be justified in terms of them.  Their perceived utility as principles will largely 
rest on the performance of those devices.  This is the essence of the reflexive 
relationship between principle and action.   
 
An extraordinary feature of the literature on deliberative democracy has been its 
unwillingness to take an encompassing view of democratic sites, institutions and 
procedures.  Mostly, key writers have recommended particular deliberative devices as 
epitomising or approximating their take on the deliberative ideal.  Cohen (1989) 
descends from a lofty ‘deliberative ideal’ to the internal workings of political parties; 
Mansbridge (1996) looks to civil society and to ‘subaltern counterpublics’; Benhabib 
(1996) to these plus traditional parliaments; Fishkin (1991) to newly-devised 
‘deliberative polls’ based on random selection; Dryzek (2000) bypasses the state for 
cross-border activist networks in transnational civil society.   
 
Of course, since it has ‘come of age’ (Bohman 1998), deliberative democracy is au 
fait  with elections, voting, liberal constitutions, and so on (though for example 
Dryzek dissents); but a systematic look at the potential role of a range of deliberative 
devices alongside others that may be ‘aggregative’ or reflective or informative – in 
line with the principles which enfold the democratic ideal - has not occurred.  This is 
where a reflexive proceduralism should have a role.  If , following the Arrow 
impossibility theorem, there is no such thing as an outcome that is not specific to the 
procedure that produced it, we can throw up our ands in despair, or . . . we can regard 
ourselves as liberated from certain unreasonable constraints in thinking about 
democracy.  If all procedures are alike in that they cannot meet certain exacting 
standards of impartiality and fairness, then we are freed to design, manipulate, 
deconstruct and reconstruct systems of devices to forge procedures to enhance 
democratic ideals in particular places15.  To do that, we need, initially, an array of 
devices at our disposal.  A reflexive proceduralism will require multiple devices, 
sequenced so as to evoke and enact the democratic principles.  These might include 
deliberative devices – such as deliberative polls, or citizens’ juries – but must also 
include a range of so-called ‘aggregative’ devices.  In this sense, a successful 
rendering of democratic sequence under the broad rubric of reflexive proceduralism 
                                                                                                                                            
as the basis for returning to foundationalist thinking; the only basis for this return would be the 
knowledge of sure foundations’ (Phillips 2000: 249). 
 
15 Dealing with ‘thick description’ of places is vital.  See the injunctions on political theorists in Geertz 
(2000), and Walzer (1994). 
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will be multi-dimensional against deliberative democracy’s one- or two-
dimensionality.   
 
What might this amalgam – perhaps post-deliberative, more likely deliberative-plus - 
look like?  Initially, what raw materials are available when we consider devices for a 
democratic procedure?  A ‘device’ is a mechanism which plays a part in constituting a 
more-or-less formal procedure by which binding collective decisions are reached for a 
political community16.  A long but radically incomplete list would consist of: 
 
- an elected parliament with legislative authority 
- implementational (and other) public agencies 
- public hearings, debates, and inquiries 
- elections for representatives 
- majority rule as the key to interpreting elections and other votes 
- proportionality as an alternative aggregative device for interpreting elections and 
other votes 
- systems of representation  
- the citizens’ initiative 
- the referendum 
- deliberative opinion polls 
- protected ‘public spaces’ of civil freedom 
- delay or pause 
- judicial review through independent courts overseeing due process 
- mixed in with various of these, voting itself (optional or compulsory) 
 
Each of these admits of a number of variations (of types of election, deliberation, 
direct voting, and so on).  For some, this is true to such an extent that we might want 
to say that they form a ‘family’ of sub-devices – for example when we speak of 
systems of representation.  Note too that there are what we might call ‘framing’ 
devices, that is devices which give expression and coherence to a sequence of other, 
specific decision devices (votes, debates, scrutiny and so on) or determine the more 
fundamental relations that obtain between them.  In this category we can speak, for 
example, of rule-establishing and rights-conferring constitutions, along with 
federation and confederation as devices which establish multi-level sequences with 
various modes of distribution of action and responsibility among the levels.  Clearly a 
great deal more can and should be said in detail about levels and types of devices.  
However, my present aim is to sketch a broad picture of them so we might keep our 
focus on the major issue at hand – desirable directions for democratic theory today. 
 
To continue in schematic vein, to raise issues of sequencing of devices is to suggest 
that a collective decision-making process will exhibit certain stages.  Expressed in 
straightforward terms, we can posit four basic stages of a collective decision-making 
process: (1) agenda-setting, (2) debate and discussion, (3) the moment of decision 
itself, and (4) the moment of implementation17.  Against this background, the single 
most important question when thinking through the new possibilities for democracy is 
this: which devices, singly and in combination, enact desired interpretations of 
                                                 
16 Schepsle (1996) writes of a ‘technology of decision’. 
17 This account is borrowed from Hyland (1995: 57). 
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democratic principles within and across the different stages of the decision-making 
process? 
 
Single devices enact particular versions of democratic principles.  Voting for 
representatives (under conditions of universal suffrage and majority rule) for example, 
evokes and enacts the aggregative and technical equality at the moment of decision 
which the principle of political equality contains.  It only slightly indirectly enacts 
inclusion in the same way; majority rule implies that all must have a say at that 
moment in the decision procedure.   On the other hand, for example, the device of the 
referendum offers a broader and more radical interpretation or enactment of the 
principle of political equality, since in principle it bypasses a more-than-equal group 
of representatives placing power in the hands or the votes of the primary community 
of citizens.  A deliberative poll, too, offers an alternative way of enacting – and thus, 
as we have seen, of recreating – political equality.  Here, the principle involves not so 
much an equal right to participate in a formal vote, as an equal opportunity to be 
selected to exercise an analogous right to participate in a specialist deliberative forum 
focussed on the issue at hand.  Notice, too, that the deliberative poll’s character would 
seem to ‘locate’ it in the ‘debate and discussion’ (or deliberative) stage of a larger 
decision procedure, thus challenging the centrality of formal and moment-of-decision 
enactments of the equality principle. 
 
The principle of inclusion, looked at through the filter of multiple devices for its 
enactment, similarly takes on both a radically indeterminate and highly practical set of 
meanings.  The electoral device of proportional representation as a way of designing 
voting procedures and implementing vote outcomes imparts a sense of inclusion as 
minimal material respect for the interests of all citizens regardless of the outcome of 
particular votes.  Judicial review by contrast could be said to embody the principle of 
inclusion in that a conception of the citizenship rights all are equally bound to will be 
defended by it in the decision-making process.  Various devices together potentially 
constitute the ‘public sphere’ in the Habermasian (1996) sense: protected rights help 
constitute spaces of free action by all outside formal state constraint, and these can 
achieve formal input into the making of binding collective decisions through electoral, 
initiative and other devices. 
 
Likewise the principle of expressive freedom finds elaboration in and among the 
devices set out above.  Free expression as performance or talk in protected public 
spaces; as voting without external impediment for one’s preferred alternative; in 
making the views of experts and others available via such devices as public inquiries 
and deliberative polls.  The principle of transparency is enacted in different guises by 
devices such as: public debates and open public inquires (revealing – and at best 
revealing efforts to conceal – elite beliefs and motives); deliberative polls (providing 
one compelling way in which we can see if informed citizen views impact upon – for 
example – representatives’ own deliberations and decisions); and of course elections 
themselves as providing a plausible answer to the question ‘why is this person 
deciding things for me?’  
 
The proto-theory being sketched here is reflexive in that we understand and modify its 
practices in the light of information about those practices; central to that information 
is the form(s) in which key democratic principles are enacted in and through those 
practices.  But it is also reflexive in that it anticipates that democracy will be done 
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differently – with emphasis on different principles, enacted through distinctive 
combinations of devices – in different times and places.  Democracy is not one-size-
fits-all.  That sort of Cold War rigidity has lost all credibility (though some minimalist 
democrats in political roles cling to it for convenience).  We are accustomed to 
thinking of democracy as standard liberal representative democracy, with elections as 
by far the most important device.  We will have to get used to it being different from 
this standard variety.  We may be on the threshold of an explosion of democratic 
forms, with the present period of innovation and experimentation in democratic theory 
a prelude18. 
 
Enacting democracy: an example of a sequence 
I will offer one illustrative interpretation of the desirable ordering of devices for the 
making of collective decisions.  This involves, of course, something along the lines of 
‘legislative reason’ or stipulation within the more dialogical, interpretive framework.  
However, by offering this illustration and briefly describing some of its virtues and 
possibilities, I do not suggest this is how democracy ought now be understood.  
Framing the illustration with a meta-theory whose raison d’etre is openness to new 
ideas and possibilities both provokes us to offer particular possibilities and to take 
care with the nature of the claims we are prepared to make on their behalf.  
 
What if, instead of favouring the particular device beloved of direct, deliberative, 
associative or other prefix-democrats, we sequenced a range of devices to achieve a 
distinctive but clearly democratic effect?  We aim to enact political equality, 
inclusion, expressive freedom and transparency in a number of guises, not as an 
academic plaything but for the democratic worth of what those enacted guises have to 
offer in the making of collective decisions. 
 
Consider the following decision procedure.  Protected free public spaces form the 
base of the sequence as an underlying feature.  With respect to agenda-setting there 
are two possibilities: issues raised in representative forums by elected representatives, 
and issues pressed on those representatives via the device of the citizens’ initiative19.  
After, for example, the requisite requirements for a citizens initiative have been 
passed, a period of delay must be observed20.  A formal or constitutional device, delay 
will create incentives for informal debate and discussion in the free public sphere.  At 
the end of the period of delay, by which time most often a range of views of 
                                                 
18 This is not to underestimate the variation in existing democratic systems.  A number of countries, for 
example, constitutionalise ways to filter into their systems traditional or additional forms of authority – 
Iran through the Islamic Guardian Council, and Zimbabwe through reserved seats in the national 
legislature for appointed tribal elders.  These and analogous cases are controversial in their own 
countries and outside; nevertheless it is wrong to claim that any such adaptations to context are 
necessarily anti- or non-democratic (see Saward 1996).  Above and beyond these issues are, of course, 
the grand typologies of democratic systems which attempt systematic pigeonholing of the genuine 
variety of democratic forms, such as that of Lijphart (1999). 
19 Direct democratic devices such as the citizens initiative and the referendum are routinely rejected by 
mainstream (e.g. Dahl 1989), and mainstream deliberative (e.g. Cohen 1989), democratic theorists.  For 
advocacy of the deployment of these devices on a systematic basis for policy decisions from within 
reasonably conventional democratic theory, see Budge (1996 and 2000), Ackerman (2000) and Saward 
(1998). 
20 There will normally be a threshold requirement for the number of signatures that must be gathered 
for a citizens initiative to succeed in reaching the formal political agenda.  In those states of the USA 
where the device is common, some percentage of the total vote in the previous presidential or 
gubernatorial election is often used, for example.  See Cronin (1989). 
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indeterminate strength will have been tossed about in the press, on TV, and so on in a 
more or less chaotic fashion, a period of deliberation.  Deliberation could take place 
which ranges (a) from the advisory to the recommendatory, (b) from the formal/state 
to the informal/nonstate, (c) from the local to the national21.  Key forums will be the 
representative parliament, equivalent bodies at subordinate territorial levels, and the 
deliberative poll, bringing together a representative sample of citizens to deliberate on 
the issue with access to experts.  There is a case for saying that the parliament cannot 
move on from deliberation with a positive assessment of the issue arising from the 
vote taken at the end of the deliberative poll22.  If a proposed law emerges positively 
from both key deliberative forums, it moves forward to formal voting by the 
legislature, but can only become law by gaining a majority in a popular referendum, 
or a series of referendums23.   
 
In this hypothetical sequence, each of these devices enacts democratic principles, in 
ways which add up – in theory at least – to a richer and more varied realisation of the 
possibilities of democratic principles, singly and in combination.  The illustration 
could in part be a description of political reality in liberal democracies like the UK or 
the USA.  On top of that, it may function as an immanent critique of how certain 
devices could enrich the enactment of principles which play a key legitimating role in 
these systems.  But what might make this conception of a democratic procedure – 
initiative-delay-deliberation-representative decision-referendum-implementation – 
compelling24? 
 
Again, just an indicative response: The direct/popular elements such as citizens 
initiative, randomly selected deliberative poll group, and the referendum carry the 
potential to be inclusive in terms of both the range and intensity of active citizen 
participation they can foster, well beyond levels realised in familiar liberal democratic 
procedures.  These devices enact and define political equality and transparency in 
ways which offer a cumulatively richer evocation of those principles, by rendering 
policy elites significantly reliant on gaining expressed popular support, and by forcing 
elites to explain their motives and reasons for positions adopted directly to citizens on 
more than one occasion in the overall process.   
 
As these comments suggest, a critical feature of such sequencing is the series of 
motivations, incentives and anticipatory reactions that specific sequences are likely to 
provoke.  Requiring referendum votes to endorse the major government policy 
                                                 
21 See Saward (2000) for an account of the variety of deliberative forums that are available in principle. 
22 I assume the idea of the deliberative poll is reasonably familiar.  Fishkin (1991) and Fishkin and 
Luskin (2000) set out the motivation behind the poll and some recent deployments.  Arguably the 
deliberative poll has (largely unexplored) potential as a component or device in real decision-making 
procedures in addition to its being a provocative social science experiment. 
23 Versions of seriality are suggested, for example, by Barber (1984) and Ackerman (2000).  Ackerman 
writes that the requirement of multiple balloting ‘will mightily constrain the temptation of the 
governing coalition to use the referendum for short-term gain’.  Further, it ‘will have an effect on 
draughtsmanship analogous to that induced by John Rawls’s famous veil of ignorance in ATheory of 
Justice, encouraging politicians to put short-term self-interest aside and to propose enduring political 
principles that the community might plausibly adopt as a part of its ongoing exercise in self-definition’ 
(Ackerman 2000: 667). 
24 Clearly this conception is very thinly described here; even as an acontextual ideal it ought to be 
spelled out much more – especially features like the rules constraining initiative and referendum, and 
the relationship between elected representatives and randomly selected representatives, and so on.  Like 
the other aspects of my argument, this is intended to be illustrative and provisional. 
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proposals25 will press representatives and other proponents to look for appealing 
arguments which are likely to sway popular majorities at each of the procedure’s 
previous stages.  This will hardly prevent deal-making of a sort on a grand scale – 
‘bribing’ the electorate with lower-tax promises, for example – but the deals will be 
more publicly visible.  If the deliberative poll is to be granted a significant role  in the 
procedure, less structured debate in the delay period will need to anticipate the effect 
of the incentives that will face the randomly selected participants.  Because anyone 
could be randomly chosen to serve, prior debate will need to address all openly rather 
than focus efforts on a selected few (such as representatives alone).  Remaining 
incentives for representatives to act more in narrower self-interest will be further 
mitigated by the negative impact on the assembly if it votes against the wishes 
expressed in the outcome of the deliberative poll (‘the parliament against the 
people!’).   
 
In short: the joint impact of the proposed devices establishes a structure of incentives 
for political actors which reinforces effective and richly mixed conceptions of the 
basic democratic principles. 
 
I reiterate the point that this is one, brief illustration of one unelaborated interpretation 
of a reflexive democratic procedure.  Among other things, its strength as a theory 
would depend on the ‘thickness’ of its invocation of democratic principles, and its fit 
with recognisable, local institutions and their justificatory discourses.   
 
Phasing 
One way to think through how deployment and sequencing of devices may provoke 
desirable incentives and rich qualities of principles is to look behind a somewhat rigid 
view of ‘stages’ of decision-making, and towards a more nuanced view of phases – or 
indeed phasing since enactment is so critical in the overall approach adopted here.  
Consider, for example, the view that particular ways of deploying devices will 
prompt, variously, reflective, decisive, or deliberative action.  Each of these modes of 
action can be seen as constituting a distinctive  ‘phase’ in a collective decision-
making procedure – a reflective or decisive phase, for example.  However, in my 
single illustrative example of a sequence, the deliberative phase does not simply 
coincide with the stage of decision-making I referred to above as that of ‘debate and 
discussion’.  Deliberation in its unstructured form in protected public spaces takes 
place, before, through and after the moment of actual ‘decision’.  Semi-structured 
deliberation will take place as initiatives go up for vote and as a final referendum 
approaches.  Different forms of structured deliberation take place at a number of 
‘stages’ in the procedure, not simply that of ‘debate and discussion’.  Deliberative 
democrats often dispute the appropriate sites and styles of deliberation they regard as 
critical to the ‘model’; a reflexive proceduralist approach, I hope to have shown, does 
not force any such false choice (or indeed any larger, and equally false, choice 
between ‘deliberative’ and ‘aggregative’ devices).  The deliberative phase can 
straddle the whole procedure, encompassing the wide variety of forms deliberation 
may take and harnessing their diverse forms of enactment of compelling democratic 
principles. 
 
                                                 
25 Budge’s (1996) suggestion, for example, is that major policy proposals in an incoming party 
government’s manifesto should be the issues that must pass a popular referendum in order to become 
law.   
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Similarly, the decisive phase runs across stages and devices.  Or, if you like, decisive 
moments are phased in at various points in the interpretation I have outlined briefly: 
the initiative, deliberative poll, assembly decision, referendum and judicial review are 
all such moments, in their ways.  Generally speaking, thinking in terms of phasing as 
well as staging democratic procedures reintroduces to us the creative complexity that 
such procedures epitomise.   
 
Procedure and substance 
Reflexive proceduralism as I have sketched it carries the potential to be multi-
dimensional, ecumenical, context-sensitive, flexible and practical.  It will be found 
objectionable for reasons arising from a number of these characteristics.  This final 
section will briefly consider one key possible objection with respect to the issue of 
procedure and substance, an objection lodged in the notion of ‘proceduralism’ itself. 
 
‘Proceduralism’ gets a rather bad press generally.  Variously, critics link the term (1) 
with one, discrete device only, most often that of majority rule26, (2) with relativism 
with respect to the possibility of truth-value in public policies (Estlund 1997), or (3) 
dismiss it as so already ‘thick’ with ethical assumptions arising from particular ways-
of-life that it is not (merely) ‘procedural’ at all (Walzer 1994).   
 
Proceduralism, in this way, looks vulnerable to alternative (constitutional, ‘epistemic’, 
deliberative) views which appear to protect universal rights against ignorant 
majorities and/or stress exclusively the importance of certain elements in the 
formation of majorities, such as deliberative forums. 
 
The response to the first of these concerns is straightforward enough – there is no 
good semantic reason why the word ‘procedure’ cannot perfectly well signify a 
sequence of decisional devices rather than one discrete device located within such a 
sequence.  The third objection is, I suggest, overstated.  Any and every real, practical 
decision procedure clearly is conceived, produced and operated within a particular 
context, and that context will provide interpretive and evaluative criteria to be applied 
to the functioning of the procedure, in turn.  The second objection, with its suggestion 
that proceduralism palls in the face of substantive approaches to what is right, what 
policies should be pursued, and so on, requires addressing in a little more detail. 
 
It is important to recognise that proceduralism is not anti-substance.  There are 
principles in the process – ‘process principles’ if you like – which make it a process in 
the first place.  Indeed, the thrust of my whole analysis has been that there are no 
political principles other than process principles.  There can be no democratic 
procedure without a procedure that enacts democratic principles (Habermas 1996: 
290-5), and principles gain the most part of their meaning through their enactment in 
devices, within procedures.  Principles and devices modify each other in practice as 
part of a reflexive process – and here one can happily endorse the view of Gutmann 
and Thompson (1999) that even ‘substantive’ principles must be regarded as 
provisional, awaiting deliberative endorsement.  It is accepted that democracy is a 
self-binding notion: it restricts itself in order to protect itself (Saward 1998: 53-57).  
According to Dahl (1989), it is only those binds which are essential to the democratic 
                                                 
26 This is the case for example in Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 26), Dahl (1989) and Schauer (1999).  
See also the comments by Macedo (1999: 6). 
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process itself which ought to be constitutionalised, or put beyond majority decision.  
Whatever these binds are, they ought to be seen as a part of the democratic procedure 
itself, and with it part of a proceduralist conception which theorises it27. 
 
A key factor that lends legitimacy to the outcomes arising from a procedure such as 
the one I sketched above is precisely the many ways in which core principles are 
enacted within the procedure.  Devices such as deliberative polls and delays and 
policy referendum votes create a greater likelihood that the range of facts and moral 
positions pertinent to the question at hand will be brought to bear. Political outcomes 
do not somehow ‘float free’ from the procedural context that gives them life; they 
remain decisions which have to be implemented within a political culture informed by 
the same principles that informed the original procedure, and which remain revocable 
in some form within and by the actors within that procedure. 
 
Some might object that, however many devices are deployed by institutional 
designers to heighten the democratic quality of a decision-making procedure, in the 
end they cannot say why the reasons offered for an outcome are good reasons 
(Estlund 1997).  And if they cannot do that, then any other ‘fair’ procedure would 
have sufficed - tossing a coin for example.  On the other hand, if there exists some 
independent standard (independent of this procedure) against which one might say the 
reasons offered are good reasons, then the value and shape of the procedure ceases to 
be a significant issue – whatever the latter comes up with, we knew the right answer 
before the procedure was even activated.28   
 
This argument, however, is problematic.  One has to ask, first, how democratic 
decisions can be right or wrong in a way that is required to posit ‘independent 
standards’.  Anyone – philosophers included – can assert that a democratically 
reached decision is wrong.  But what is it that makes their judgement the one that 
counts?  For one thing, fallibilism with respect to moral claims is a foundation of 
democracy; for another, there are (e.g.) consequentialist as well as epistemic reasons 
why we might value democracy, even if we assumed that among epistemic benefits 
were strong truth-producing propensities.     
 
The basic question that must be answered by any proponent of this objection is: where 
does this ‘independent standard’ some from?  What makes it ‘independent’ 
(independent of what, exactly?).  Presumably any ‘independent standard’ would have 
to come from some procedure separate from the democratic procedure itself.  The 
strongest candidate, one supposes, will be an ideal democratic procedure, or if you 
like a hypothetical ideal (see the argument of Cohen 1989).  On one view, one could 
say that if for any real procedure there is an ideal version, then there is an independent 
standard (what the ideal procedure would have produced) against which real 
outcomes may be judged.  Given this, the real procedure loses significance, because a 
                                                 
27 Dahl for one is quite unclear about what precisely the terms of self-binding may include.  Clearly any 
detailed response will be open to legitimate contestation.  
28 As Bohman (1998: 403) has put it, with respect to deliberative democracy: ‘Deliberative democracy 
seems caught on the horns of a dilemma: if it establishes its moral credentials of legitimacy via an ideal 
procedure, it cannot underwrite its epistemic claims; if it establishes its epistemic claims, they can only 
be underwritten by standards that are not only procedure-independent, but also independent of 
deliberation’. 
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near-perfect outcome is surely preferable to a less-perfect one.  There are just two 
problems.  First, any and every procedure has an ideal version of itself.  It could not 
have been conceived and created and operated without some form of comparatively 
abstract idealisation which allows of the conception of the procedure in the first 
place29.  And second, who decides what the outcome of the (an) ideal procedure 
is/would be?  The philosopher?  Even in seemingly straightforward cases where facts 
clearly pertinent to a decision were distorted in the procedure, and this distortion 
seems to have had an impact on the nature of the decision, there will be legitimate 
dispute about the centrality of those facts to the issue and the extent to which the 
legitimacy of the outcome may properly be questioned30.   
 
In the end, perhaps, we need to accept that democracy is a ‘gamble’ – sometimes the 
people can get it wrong (Dahl 1989).  Maybe – and this is not meant frivolously – 
they need to get it wrong once or twice to get it right in the end with conviction, 
clarity and authenticity.  However much and for whatever reasons we may value 
democracy, there is no decisive justification for democracy (Galston 2000).  There 
can be no final closure on what democratic principles are the correct principles 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996).  We make – and from time to time must radically 
remake – democratic systems with principles, values, hopes and devices that only live 
and compel through enactment; and there is nobody to enact them for us but 
ourselves. 
 
Conclusion: new perspectives, new possibilities 
A reflexive proceduralism is an approach or framework for the construction of 
theories, and not a theory in itself.  It resides in particular social contexts and seeks to 
interpret features of them rather than to legislate political rights and wrongs on some 
putative foundational basis.  But despite – indeed, I would argue, because of – its 
embrace of plurality and diversity, a reflexive proceduralist approach to democracy 
carries with it some important assumptions and potentialities. 
 
First, it matters that democracy can be practiced in radically different, including 
unconventional, ways.  Iran, for example, is substantially a democratic polity, though 
not a liberal one.  This is a straightforward, factual claim which would arouse little 
controversy among those with a reasonable familiarity with recent Iranian political 
history.  It is, however, a claim that carries subversive overtones in the context of US-
dominated discourses about international security and its challenges today.  A 
reflexive proceduralist approach, being ecumenical in terms of culture and context, 
provides a context for the decoupling of  ‘democracy’ and ‘the West’, and I for one 
interpret this as a positive virtue. 
 
Second, and relatedly, reflexive proceduralism’s relativising perspective reminds us, 
among other things, that the dominant notions of  democracy (in the academy at least) 
                                                 
29 Indeed, to make things worse for the type of objection to proceduralism I am considering, there will 
invariably be more than one idealisation of a given procedure, reflecting (for example) different 
ideological positions. 
30 Any type of proceduralism involving real decision-making is rendered unimportant and uninteresting 
if independent standards are posited.  If there are independent standards, then procedures must be one 
of two basic types: producers of perfect procedural justice, or imperfect procedural justice, to use the 
terms of Rawls (1972).  The reflexive proceduralist approach comes closer to Rawls’s category of 
‘pure procedural justice’, with the significant difference that it does not claim the mantle of 
incontrovertible ‘justice’ for whatever the outcomes of the procedure happen to be. 
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are produced by American theorists who rarely examine the fact that their universal 
prescriptions are rooted in implicit understandings about the particular nation-state 
which happens to be both their base and the global hegemon.  Real tailoring to context 
would in fact be highly radical in view of the contemporary politics of the production 
of democratic theory. 
 
Third, in these sceptical times, it matters that we aim to be interpretive rather than 
legislative in the way we approach democracy and related topics; that we take time to 
map an appropriate field of concepts and perspectives as much as recommend 
determinate answers.  In the same vein, this approach may help us to make sense of 
why democracy, and not justice, is now at the centre of First World political theory 
debates at least. Could it be because, however precisely it is understood, democracy 
must in some way embrace contingency and pluralism, and with it take real 
procedures and their configuration seriously? 
 
Fourth, a reflexive proceduralist approach holds out the promise of being highly 
generative or productive of new, surprising perspectives on what democracy may 
mean, and may in due course become.  For example, its openness with respect to 
which principles lie at the core of democracy, and with respect to how principles 
might be valued and interpreted in their enactment, leaves room for the further 
articulation of non-human interests and their incorporation into democratic procedures 
which some writers have begun (e.g. Dobson 1996; Eckersley 1996 and 2000).  Its 
openness with regard to devices and their sequencing in collective decision-making 
leaves the door ajar for new devices – such as the precautionary principle – to find 
their place at the core of democratic practices as social values shift and evolve.  
Relatedly, the emergence of deliberative thinking in democratic theory has made 
convincing the case that deliberative devices ought to occupy a place at the heart of 
real democratic decision-making.  The productivity of that point is obscured, 
unnecessarily, by deliberative theorists taking too much time suggesting that there is 
something called the ‘deliberative model of democracy’ which is opposed to 
something called the ‘aggregative model of democracy’. 
 
Finally, one provocative aspect of the potential productivity of the approach outlined 
here lies in a topic that I have not touched on above, namely the political unit or 
political community for which democratic procedures operate (standardly, of course, 
the nation-state in the modern era).  Traditional analyses arguably overestimate the 
extent to which a pre-existing unit constitutes the scope and reach of the political 
structures which rule over it, and underestimate as a result the extent to which the unit 
– or the subject community – is itself constituted by the inclusive or exclusive 
character of its collective decision procedures.  If it is desirable that democracy evolve 
and adapt to encompass communities of fate beyond and across national boundaries, 
then we will need to rethink the very idea of a democratic procedure.  Part of that 
rethinking, at least, will involve fabricating and deploying sequences of devices each 
of which is inclusive or participative in ways that address the needs of different, 
potential constituencies, regardless of their location within traditionally understood 
political boundaries31.  In this way, new and unfamiliar forms of democracy may help 
                                                 
31 Between them, the works of Held (1995) and Dryzek (2000) represent influential and contrasting 
approaches to cosmopolitan or transnational democratisation. 
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to constitute a political world in a democratic image, rather than wait to catch up, 
reactively, to complex cultural and technological changes beyond its reach. 
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